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FOLLOW THE MONEY:
ERISA PLAN INVESTMENTS IN MUTUAL
FUNDS AND INSURANCE
NELL HENNESSY*
Federal and state securities regulators have been
investigating allegations of improper trading practices at a
number of mutual fund families since last fall. Several firms have
been charged with civil securities fraud related to their trading
activities and some individuals have been charged with criminal
activity. Rumors of more charges and lawsuits abound. Since most
401(k) plans and some pension plans are invested in mutual funds,
plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries are trying to determine the
prudent course of action if the funds in their retirement plans or
their affiliates are involved in this growing scandal. In addition,
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to
prevent future abuses are likely to complicate the administration
of 401(k) and other defined contribution plans.
As the investigation widens, both state and federal regulators
have also begun to focus on fees paid by mutual funds to brokerdealers and pension consultants. The SEC is re-examining rule
12b-1, which permits payments from mutual fund assets for the
costs of marketing and distribution of fund shares. Investors often
use such payments to offset plan record-keeping, trust expenses
and participant communication costs.
The Department of Labor ("DOL") is also investigating
mutual fund practices in plans subject to the Employee
Retirement Investment Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").' This
investigation is likely to focus on fiduciary responses to the mutual
fund scandals and whether investment advisers and consultants
received improper fees.
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1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2000) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code,

26 U.S.C.).
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MUTUAL FUND FEES

There are a variety of fees paid by mutual funds and their
shareholders. Plan fiduciaries need to identify what fees are being
charged and how those fees impact the plan's returns. In addition,
they need to understand the extent to which those fees are being
shared with the plan's investment advisers and service providers.
A.

OperatingExpenses

Every mutual fund pays fees to its investment adviser(s) and
various service providers. Since February 2004, the SEC has
required that fees be displayed in a table in the mutual fund
prospectus. Mutual fund fees are usually compared on the basis of
the "total annual fund operating expenses" (shown on the fee
table), which represents the fund's annual operating expenses
expressed as a percentage of the fund's average net assets
(sometimes called the "expense ratio"). The fee chart shows three
categories of fees, which make up the fund's annual operating
expenses:
1.

Management Fees

Management fees consist of portfolio management fees and
other fees paid to the fund's investment adviser. All funds have
management fees, which can vary significantly. These fees must
be approved by the mutual fund's independent board of directors
(or trustees, depending on the fund's organizational structure).
2.

12b-1 Fees

Rule 12b-1 fees cover distribution costs and shareholder
services. Distribution costs include advertising, printing and
mailing of prospectuses and sales literature and compensation to
brokers and others who sell fund shares. Shareholder services
permitted to be paid with 12b-1 fees basically involve responding
to investor inquiries and providing investors with information
about their investments. Mutual fund investors paid over $10
billion in 12b-1 fees indirectly in 2004.' Of this amount, 52% went
to pay for shareholder services after investment, primarily to
banks, broker-dealers and 401(k) record keepers.4

2. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No.
26372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244, 11,246-48 (Mar. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 17

C.F.R. pts. 210, 239, 249, 270 and 274).
3. Investment Company Institute, How Mutual Funds Use 12b-1 Fees,
FUNDAMENTALS, Feb. 11, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/

index.html#Fundamentals%20Newsletter.
4. Id.
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3. Other Expenses
Other expenses include any shareholder service expenses that
are not already included in the 12b-1 fees, such as custodial
expenses, legal and accounting expenses, transfer agent expenses
and other administrative expenses. These fees are paid from the
fund assets.
B. ShareholderFees
In addition to
fund, and therefore
also have fees paid
These include loads,
and account fees.
1.

the operating expenses paid by the mutual
shared by all investors, some mutual funds
by shareholders based on their investments.
purchase fees, redemption fees, exchange fees

Loads

Loads are amounts paid to brokers on the purchase or sale of
mutual fund shares. A "front-end load" goes to the broker that
sells the fund's shares and reduces the amount invested in the
fund. For example, if a plan invested $100,000 in a mutual fund
with a 5% front-end load, $5,000 (5% of $100,000) would go to the
broker and only the remaining $95,000 would be invested in the
fund. The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
limits front-end loads to 8.5%.
A "back-end load" is a sales fee paid to the broker that sells
the fund's shares. The most common type of back-end load is the
"contingent deferred sales load," which typically decreases to zero
if the investor holds his or her shares long enough.
Funds that advertise themselves as "no-load" funds may still
charge other shareholder fees, such as those described below. They
will also have operating expenses. Recent research by the
Investment Company Institute indicates that 12b-1 fees are being
used to replace front-end loads. In 2004, 40% of 12b-1 fees went to
investment advisers and brokers who assisted clients in selecting
their investments.5
2.

PurchaseFees

Purchase fees are paid to the fund (not to a broker) to defray
some of the fund's costs associated with purchase of the fund
shares.
3. Redemption Fees
Redemption fees are paid to the fund (not to a broker) when
shareholders sell or redeem shares, to defray fund costs associated

5. Id.
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with a shareholder's redemption. Redemption fees have recently
been imposed to discourage market timing (rapid trading in and
out of a fund). As discussed below, the SEC recently adopted a rule
that permits redemption fees of up to 2% in order to discourage
market timing.6
4. Exchange Fees
Exchange fees are fees imposed on shareholders if they
transfer assets to another fund within the same family of funds.
5. Account Fees
Account fees are typically imposed on accounts with balances
below a specified dollar amount.7
C. Fee Breakpoints and Share Classes
Some mutual funds charge lower sales loads for larger
investments. The investment levels necessary to obtain a reduced
sales load are commonly referred to as "breakpoints." If
breakpoints exist, the SEC requires that the fund disclose them.
In addition, the NASD prohibits its member brokerage firms from
selling shares in amounts that are "just below" the fund's sales
load breakpoint simply to earn a higher commission.
Many mutual funds offer more than one class of shares,
sometimes based on the amount invested or the category of
investor. The classes invest in the same investment portfolio and
have the same investment objectives and policies, but will have
different shareholder services or distribution arrangements with
different fees and expenses, which will impact their returns. One
class may have a front-end load while another is no-load but has
12b-1 fees. The SEC calculator can be useful in comparing these
different classes, since the underlying investment performance is
the same and the differences in returns are entirely attributable to
the differences in the fee structure.

6. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Mutual Fund Redemption Fee Rule,

Proposes Rule to Define "NRSRO," Approves PCAOB Budget and Reviews
FASB Accounting Support Fee, Release No. 2005-28 (Mar. 4, 2005), at

http'//www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-28.htm.
7. Because of the different types of fees associated with calculating the
cost of a fund, the SEC website provides a mutual fund cost calculator that can
help plan fiduciaries compare the costs of different mutual funds, at

http'J/www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm
2000).

(last modified July 24,
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II. SEC AND STATE INVESTIGATIONS OF 12B-1 AND OTHER FEES
PAID BY MUTUAL FUNDS
The SEC has been investigating 12b-1 and other fees paid by
mutual funds or their advisers to defined contribution plans and
their service providers. In 1980, the SEC promulgated rule 12b-1
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which allows mutual
fund advisers to make payments from fund assets for the costs of
marketing and distributing fund shares. Within 401(k) plans,
these fees are typically used to offset plan record-keeping and
participant communication costs.
The original justification for the plan fees, as put forth by the
mutual fund industry in the 1970s, was that such fees help attract
new shareholders into funds through advertising and by providing
incentives for brokers to market the fund, thus resulting in lower
costs through economies of scale. The 12b-1 fees are paid from the
fund and therefore reduce the yield to the shareholders. A recent
study by an SEC economist, however, found that "12b-1 plans are
successful at attaining faster asset growth; however, shareholders
do not obtain any of the benefits from the asset growth."9 The
increased growth benefits the fund adviser, by increasing its total
fees, while not increasing the shareholders' earnings.
The SEC has adopted a revision to rule 12b-1 that prohibits
the use of directed brokerage by the mutual fund to broker-dealers
in exchange for distribution of the fund." Prior to the rule change,
the adviser to a mutual fund family could direct brokerage
transactions to broker-dealers, who in exchange placed the funds
in the brokers' distribution networks. The SEC is likely to reexamine rule 12b-1 to determine whether it should be eliminated

or modified further.
In June 2004, the SEC began an inquiry into payments to
defined contribution plans and their consultants. The SEC issued
a series of questions to mutual funds, asking them for information
about a variety of plan expense reimbursement arrangements.
Specifically, the SEC questionnaire asked funds to identify:
*

Each type of direct payment made with respect to a defined
contribution plan;

8. Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment
Company Act Release No. 11414, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898 (Nov. 7, 1980) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270 and 274).
9. Lori Walsh, The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1
Plans: An Examination of Fund Flows, Expenses and Returns (Apr. 26, 2004)
(unpublished paper), available at http'J/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/
lwalsh042604.pdf.
10. Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance
Distribution, Investment Company Act Release No. 26356, 69 Fed. Reg. 9726
(Mar. 1, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
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*

The type of entities to whom such payments are made (e.g., TPAs,
consultants, record keepers, plan sponsors, etc.);

"

Whether the payments
agreement;

*

Whether the payments are based on a flat rate, a percentage of
assets or some other basis;

*

The type of plan covered by the arrangement (e.g., 401(k) plans,
union plans, government plans, deferred compensation plans);

*

Factors considered when entering into an arrangement;

*

Payments made to retirement plan platforms offered by record
keepers or consultants, including finder's fees, consulting fees and
directed brokerage;

*

The entities making and receiving such payments;

*

The extent to which payments result in initial selection or different
placement in defined contributions;

"

Whether larger payments provide greater access to plan
participants, either in person or through marketing materials, or
inclusion in larger plans;

*

Types of plan expenses eligible for reimbursement and monitoring
to ensure that payments are only used for reimbursement of
permissible plan expenses;

"

Source of payments (e.g., 12b-1 payments);

*

Copies of 12b-1 plans;

"

Information about the top twenty-five defined contribution plans for
which the fund or an affiliate made payment (including payments
made in 2002, 2003 and, through 2004, the identity of the plan and
the recipients of the payments and services provided);

*

Information about the top ten recipients of payments if not related
to the top twenty-five plans, measured by 2003 payments;

"

Information provided to the fund's board of directors;

"

Prospectus disclosure about the payments;

"

Samples of any other disclosure
contribution plans;

"

Samples of materials used to describe payments related to defined
contribution plans, including marketing materials and responses to
RFPs;

were

made

pursuant

to

a

written

about payments to defined
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" Any documents, received or sent, that refer to a rebate or any form
of that word, including e-mails; and
" The three executives most familiar with payments related to
defined contribution plans.
The purpose of the SEC investigation was to identify
payments by mutual funds that are not permitted under 12b-1.
Some of the SEC's questions, however, appear aimed at
determining whether payments were used for legitimate plan
expenses, which is actually an ERISA issue.
It is likely that the results of this SEC inquiry will be shared
with the DOL, which is also auditing mutual fund practices. The
DOL has long held the position that fiduciaries should be aware of
all fees being paid through their investments. While the SEC will
likely focus on improper payments by the mutual fund, the DOL is
likely to focus on whether participants have received adequate
disclosure and whether the payments were used for permissible
plan administration or other fiduciary expenses.
The SEC and state officials, particularly the Attorney General
of New York, have reached settlements with a number of financial
institutions with regard to alleged improper mutual fund fee
practices. Settlements reached with regulators or voluntarily
offered by plans include:

Company
(and Issue)
Citigroup Global
Markets

Edward Jones

Mutual Fund Fee Settlements
Investor
Alleged Improper
Com eston
Practices
Compensation
Penalties and
$20 million

$75 million

Franklin Templeton $20 million penalty to
funds plus $1
disgorgement
$14 million to funds
plus $4 million

Failure to disclose
brokerage used to
pay for "shelf space"
for mutual funds
Sale of Class B share
to investors who
qualified for Class A
shares
Failure to disclose
revenue sharing
payment, including
directed brokerages
Sales and marketing
support payments

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:867

California fines and
reimbursement

MFS

Morgan Stanley

Putnam

III.

Canadian $49.2 million
(US $42 million)
$50 million paid to the Failure to disclose
MFS Funds
brokerage used to
pay for "shelf space"
for mutual funds
$50 million
Failure to disclose
receipt of brokerage
to pay for "shelf
space" for mutual
funds
$40 million to be
Failure to disclose
repaid to funds
brokerage used to
pay for promotion of
mutual funds

INSURANCE COMMISSION OVERRIDES AND

OTHER PAYMENTS TO INSURANCE BROKERS

State officials have also been investigating potential abuses in
connection with the sale of insurance products. Large national
insurance brokers have had arrangements with insurance
companies that provide for contingent payments, commonly called
overrides, paid on the basis of the total amount of insurance that a
broker's clients purchase from a particular insurance company.
These overrides provide an incentive for brokers to steer business
towards insurance companies with which they have these override
arrangements.
On November 16, 2004, Eliot Spitzer, the Attorney General of
New York, testified that: "Not only do insurance brokers receive
contingent commissions to steer business, but many brokers, with
the assistance and collusion of insurance companies, engage in
systematic fraud and market manipulation in order to ensure that
profitable and high volume business goes to a few selected
insurance companies." 1 He specifically identified employee

11. Insurance Brokerage Practices, Including Potential Conflicts of Interest
and the Adequacy of the Current Regulatory Framework: Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget and International Security
of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs (prepared testimony of
Eliot
Spitzer,
New
York
Attorney
General),
available at
http'//www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/insurance-investigationjtestimon
y.pdf. (Nov. 16, 2004).
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12
benefits as an area in which this practice occurred.
In 2002, three brokerage firms comprised over 60% of the
global insurance market." All have announced that they will no
longer enter into contingency arrangements. Without admitting
guilt, the two largest insurance brokers have settled with state
regulators to resolve these issues. Marsh & McLennan Companies,
Inc., agreed to pay $850 million to compensate their clients. Aon
has agreed to pay $190 million. Complaints have also been filed
against Universal Life Resources, Inc., a broker of insurance
products to employee benefit plans and their participants.14
Criminal charges have been filed against executives at the
American Insurance Group, Inc. ("AG") and ACE, Ltd. Both
companies announced that they were eliminating contingent
commission arrangements. The New York Attorney General has
announced that AIG is cooperating in the investigation and that
he expects a civil resolution."

IV. PAYMENTS TO ERISA FIDUCIARIES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS

ERISA provides that the assets of the plan must be "held for
the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the
plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan." 6 Assets of the plan must never "inure to
the benefit of any employer" 7 and plan fiduciaries must act "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries .... 16
Payments by a plan to a service provider will create a
prohibited transaction, unless done in compliance with a statutory
or regulatory exemption, since the definition of "party in interest"
with whom transactions are prohibited includes all fiduciaries and
service providers. 9 Payments to service providers are normally
permitted if they come within the statutorily prohibited
transaction exemption for "necessary services." That exemption
allows payment by a plan to a party in interest for any services if:
* The services are necessary expenses of the plan's establishment or
operation;

12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 3 (citing Swiss Re market study).
14. Id. at 5.
15. Press Release, Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding
the AIG Investigation (Apr. 4, 2005), available at httpJ/www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2005/apr/apr04b_05.html.
16. ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A), uses virtually identical language in describing how
fiduciaries are to act.
17. ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).
18. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
19. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14).
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* The services are furnished under a reasonable contract or
arrangement that permits termination by the plan without penalty
to the plan on reasonably short notice; and
"

The compensation paid for the services is reasonable. 0

A service is deemed "necessary" if it is "appropriate and
helpful to the plan.., in carrying out the purposes for which the
plan is established or maintained."2 The DOL believes the
appropriate method for determining whether a contract or
arrangement is reasonable is to apply a facts and circumstances
test. Thus, the reasonableness can only be ascertained on a caseby-case basis.
Rule 12b-1 fees and other payments from mutual funds are
often used to pay for bundled services provided to plans, such as
record-keeping, trust services and participant communications.
Record-keeping and trust services are clearly necessary plan
services. Some mutual funds provide a sum of money that plan
fiduciaries can use to defray plan expenses. Participant
communication expenses can be paid by the plan as long as they
relate to the plan paying for the communication. In 2001, the DOL
issued a set of hypotheticals to clarify which expenses may be paid
from an ERISA plan. One hypothetical included a discussion of
allocating expenses when the communications involved more than
one plan or a mixture of ERISA-covered benefits with other
benefits provided by the employer, such as vacation and pay.'
Another hypothetical involved individual benefit statements
for a defined benefit plan and a booklet covering all benefits
provided by the employer, whether provided through an ERISAcovered plan or otherwise (e.g., physical fitness center, limousine
service, picnic). 2'3 The DOL concluded that the cost of individual
benefit statements, although not required by ERISA or the Code,
could be a reasonable plan expense. With respect to a booklet
covering all benefits offered to employees, a plan could pay only its
proportionate share of the cost of the booklet. The DOL noted that
"[w]hile plan administrators and fiduciaries should be given
considerable deference with regard to their disclosure decisions,
plan administrators should be able to explain their disclosure
decisions and justify the costs attendant thereto."" Clearly the

20. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2).
21. 29 C.F.R § 2550.408b-2(b) (2005).
22. Employee Benefits Security Administration, Advisory Opinion
Guidance on Settlor v. Plan Expenses, Hypothetical 5, http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/publi/programs/ori/advisory2001hsetQ&Are.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2005).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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National Office of the DOL has recognized the importance of
employee communications and determined that the DOL should
not place obstacles in the way of meaningful communication with
the participants.
The DOL regulations give little guidance on the meaning of
"reasonable compensation" or "reasonable contract" in connection
with the provision of office space and services by a party in
interest. Reasonable compensation "depends on the particular
facts and circumstances
of each
case. " " Unreasonable
compensation includes any excessive compensation (i.e., not
deductible by a taxpayer as an ordinary and necessary business
expense under I.R.C. § 162).16 Compensation that is not excessive,
the regulations
caution, is not necessarily reasonable
compensation." At most, reasonable compensation should mean
compensation commensurate with that paid by similar plans for
similar services to unaffiliated third parties. However, reasonable
compensation does not include any compensation to a fiduciary
already receiving full-time pay from the employer sponsor or an
employee organization containing participants.2
The DOL has issued a booklet to help plan fiduciaries
understand mutual fund fees, as well as fees paid in connection
with bank and insurance products.' To assist plan fiduciaries in
comparing these fees, the DOL has also provided on its website a
form developed by the Investment Company Institute, the
American Bankers Association and the American Council of Life
Insurance. ° Despite the fact that the form was developed by the
trade associations for the mutual fund, banking and insurance
industries, most plan fiduciaries have found difficulty getting the
information from many offerors of these investment products. The
new SEC disclosure rules, requiring publication of the fee chart in
mutual fund prospectuses, will greatly assist plan fiduciaries, at
least in comparing mutual fund fees.
Although the statutory exemptions provide that "the
prohibitions of section 406 shall not apply,"' both the DOL and the
IRS have taken the position that the exemption for office space
and necessary services does not encompass the prohibitions

25. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e)(2) (as amended
in 1980).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (as amended in 1993).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e)(6).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e)(3).
29. Understanding Retirement Plan Fees and Expenses (May 2004), at
http'//www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/undrstndgrtrmnt.html.
30. 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form, available at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/pd401kefim.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408c-2(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(e)(6).
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against fiduciary conflicts of interest in ERISA section 406(b) and
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(E)-(F). 2 However, a fiduciary does not have a
conflict of interest if the services are provided to the plan without
additional compensation, other than reimbursement of direct
expenses.' A fiduciary may receive additional compensation if
retained by a second unrelated fiduciary to provide the service to
the plan. But mere approval by a second fiduciary does not suffice.
The fiduciary receiving the additional compensation cannot
exercise any "authority, control or responsibility" in his or her role
as fiduciary to cause the plan to pay the additional amounts for
services.' Thus, absent an exemption, a consultant who provides
investment advice cannot recommend the purchase of insurance
contracts that will give him commissions, even though the decision
to purchase the contract is made by another fiduciary and the
consultant makes full disclosure.'
A plan fiduciary must "discharge his duties... in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with [Titles I and
IV of ERISA]."" Thus, the plan cannot pay an otherwise
permissible plan expense if the plan document provides that the
plan sponsor will pay the expense. If the plan is silent about the
payment of expenses, however, the DOL has stated that "the plan
may pay reasonable administrative expenses."" The plan may also
be amended to eliminate a requirement that the employer pay
administrative expenses, permitting the plan to pay these
expenses prospectively.' In light of increasing regulation and
enforcement, plan fiduciaries should follow certain guidelines to
avoid potential legal action.

32. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(a); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(1). Courts that
have considered this issue and followed the agencies' interpretation include
Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982) and Gilliam v.
Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255 (D.N.J. 1980).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(5)(iii).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(e)(2); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(5)(ii).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(f) Example (2); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-6(a)(6)
Example (2). In issuing this interpretation, the DOL promptly granted a class

exemption that permitted insurance brokers to receive commissions, if the
purchase of the insurance was approved by an unrelated plan fiduciary.
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-79, 42 Fed. Reg. 32395 (Oct. 31, 1977),
reprinted as amended in 49 Fed. Reg. 13208 (Apr. 3, 1984).
36. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
37. U.S. DOL Advisory Opinion 97-03A (Jan. 23, 1997), available at

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory97/97-03.htm.
38. Id. The DOL indicated that the expense of this amendment could not be
charged to the plan.
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A. Request Information from Investment Manager(s)
Planfiduciaries should ask their investment fund manager(s)
to provide them with the following plan information:
Written copies of their policies and procedures on late
trading, market timing and fair value pricing;
" Information on what steps they are taking to prevent market
timing and late trading;
*

Frequent updates on the status of all internal or external
investigations;

* Immediate notification of any significant changes in professional
staff; and
*

Notice of changes in assets under management as this information
becomes available for public reporting.

If a plan has an ongoing investment adviser who monitors
performance for the plan, then the adviser is almost certainly
undertaking this investigation on behalf of all of its clients. In
many cases, advisers talk with the fund managers directly and,
because they represent a large number of plans, they can (and do)
maintain frequent and in-depth contact. A report from the adviser
may be all that is necessary if the adviser's recommendation is to
keep the existing funds. However, plan fiduciaries should also
make sure that they are aware of any potential conflicts of interest
that their advisers may have, such as affiliation with the mutual
fund adviser or receipt of 12b-1 fees or other fees that might affect
their judgment.
B. EvaluateAlternatives
A plan fiduciary should evaluate developments in the field to
determine what further action, if any, should be taken to protect
plan participants. These actions may include:
" Exploring replacement of a fund;
*

Pursuing claims on behalf of participants or participating in
restitution paid by a fid; or

" Terminating a record-keeping relationship or other administrative
relationship.
However, none of these actions should be taken precipitously,
particularly changing funds or record keepers since that would be
disruptive to participants.
If funds are changed without participant direction, plan
fiduciaries may lose the protection of section 404(c) of ERISA,
which absolves fiduciaries of responsibility for investment
decisions made by participants. This protection applies only if the
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participants actually make the investment decisions. In plans that
designate asset categories, rather than particular funds, in their
plan documents and summary plan descriptions, a good argument
can be made that changing the fund in that asset category does
not negate the participants' decisions to invest in that asset
category. In any event, fiduciaries who make the decision to either
retain the current funds or replace them with new ones will be
held responsible for prudently selecting and monitoring the funds.
C. Communicate with PlanParticipants
Participants typically read the newspapers and, therefore,
harbor concerns about what is happening to their accounts. There
is a natural tendency for plan fiduciaries to wait until all the facts
are in and the decisions are made before communicating with plan
participants. That is usually a mistake, since it allows employees'
anxieties to grow. Instead, plan fiduciaries should communicate
immediately that the appropriate fiduciaries are taking action by,
for example:
" Requiring a detailed response from the fund manager regarding the
allegations;
* Hiring outside counsel to advise on how best to protect plan
participants;
" Requiring information from the managers of other funds; or
" Investigating alternative investment options as necessary.
In addition, in 401(k) plans, plan fiduciaries should remind
the participants that they can change their investment elections at
any time.
V. SETTLEMENTS AND CLASS ACTION PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MUTUAL FUND TRADING SCANDALS
In addition to the mutual fund fee issues, both the SEC and
state officials have been investigating trading practices of mutual
funds and their shareholders. The two practices being attacked by
regulators are late trading and market timing.
Late trading involves placing orders to buy or sell after the
4:00 p.m. (Eastern) close of the markets. Submitting a trade after
the close is a "sure bet" because daily mutual fund transactions
are priced at the closing net asset value ("NAV"), and the party
entering the trade knows whether the mutual fund's value has
gone up or down.
Market timing, on the other hand, involves large trades in
and out of a fund in a short period to make quick profits as a result
of short-term trends (the functional equivalent of day trading).
Late trading is illegal. Market timing, while legal, may violate
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representations made by the mutual fund that it does not permit
large trades in and out within a short time period.
Both practices harm the remaining shareholders. Elliot
Spitzer, the Attorney General of New York who has brought many
of the civil fraud cases, has estimated that such practices have cost
mutual fund shareholders over $5 billion.
The Assistant Secretary who heads the DOL's Employee
Benefit Security Administration issued a statement in February
2004 advising plan fiduciaries that they have an obligation to
evaluate whether to participate in litigation or settlements arising
out of the mutual fund trading scandals.39 The same principle
would apply to the mutual fund and insurance settlements
discussed above. Plan fiduciaries must weigh the potential cost of
participating in litigation against the potential and likelihood of
recoveries for plan participants. Given the active enforcement
activities of state and federal officials, yielding settlements for the
benefit of investors, and the active plaintiffs' bar, it is likely that
plan fiduciaries need only monitor litigation and then evaluate the
resulting settlements, if any, to ensure that their participants'
interests are protected. Plan fiduciaries should also assert claims
on behalf of the plan and its participants when these settlement
funds are distributed.
In her February 2004 statement, the DOL Assistant
Secretary indicated that fiduciaries with funds involved in some
wrongdoing should consider:
* The nature of the alleged abuses;
* The potential economic impact of those abuses on the plan's
investments;
" The steps taken by the fund to limit the potential for such abuses in
the future; and
" Any remedial action taken or contemplated to make investors
whole.
Plan fiduciaries should investigate and be able to
demonstrate that they have investigated these matters. The DOL
has begun a broad sweeping investigation of mutual fund
investments in plans and is likely to be looking at fiduciary
responses to the trading scandals as well as the underlying
abuses. All fiduciary actions and decisions should be documented,
including any inquiries that were made about the trading and

39. Fiduciary Responsibilities Related to Mutual Funds: Statement of

Assistant Secretary Ann L. Combs on the Duties of Fiduciaries in Light of
Recent Mutual Fund Investigations (Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroomi/sp021704.html (last visited May 15, 2005).
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scandals issues. This will not only assist plan fiduciaries in
complying with any DOL inquiry, it will also demonstrate that the
plan fiduciaries had monitored the investments and made
considered judgments, even if in hindsight it becomes apparent
those decisions were wrong. Neither the courts nor the DOL is
likely to challenge a thoughtful decision based on advice of
disinterested experts, even in light of subsequent events.
Virtually every mutual fund manager received a subpoena for
information from state or federal regulators, as part of a broadbased investigation designed to ferret out additional violations. In
some cases, the fund adviser fired or otherwise disciplined
individuals responsible for the improper trading and committed to
make shareholders whole. In many cases, the SEC and state
regulators have obtained settlements that require payments,
including amounts characterized as penalties rather than
compensation, to be paid to the mutual fund shareholders who
were harmed by the improper practices. Settlements with
securities regulators to date include:
Mutual Fund Trading Settlements
Penalties
Shareholder
Fund Family
Compensation
$30 million penalties
$50 million plus
AIM
(included in $50
million to be
$15 million annual
distributed to
fees
in
reduction
shareholders)
$250 million penalty
Alliance Capital 20% annual reduction
in fees for five years
Management
Banc of America $250 million restitution $125 million penalty
(included in $375
plus $125 million
million to
penalty
shareholders)
$400,000 NASD
penalty
$70 million penalties
$20 million SEC
penalty (included in
$50 million to be
distributed to
shareholders)

Fleet Boston
Franklin
Templeton

$70 million restitution
$50 million to
shareholders

Freemont

$5 million
Massachusetts fine
$2.1 million restitution $2 million
Former CEO fined
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Invesco

$325 million

Janus

$100 million to
shareholders plus $25
million annual
reduction in
management fees for
five years

MFS

$225 million for market
timing plus $25 million
annual reduction in
management fees for
five years
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$127,000
$110 million penalty
(included in $50
million to be
distributed to
shareholders)
SEC penalties of $50
million (part of $100
million to be
distributed to
shareholders) plus
$1.2 million Colorado
penalties

Pilgrim Baxter

Putnam

Strong Capital

State Street
Research

Administrative fine of
$1 million, to be used
for educating
investors, for market
timing; $50 million for
directed brokerage
Adviser to pay $100
Penalties of $20
million
million each for
company and coCo-founders to pay $80 founders included in
million each
amounts to be
distributed to
shareholders
$108.5 million to
Penalties of $100
shareholders and
million (part of $110
implementation of fund million to be
governance measures
distributed to
shareholders)
$40 million for investor $40 million in civil
losses and $35 million penalties.
reduction in fees over
five years.
Richard S. Strong,
former Chairman, paid
$60 million in
penalties and was
barred for life from the
money management
business
$1.5 million

Class action lawsuits involving allegations of late trading and
market timing have also been brought against the various mutual
fund families, including those in which the regulators have not
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brought enforcement actions. These class action cases have been
consolidated before a multi-district litigation panel of three judges
°
The court has
in the U.S. District Court for Maryland.
established a website for the mutual fund investment litigation,"
which will help plan fiduciaries and their advisers monitor the
cases as they move forward. The cases have been brought under
the federal securities laws, the Investment Company Act of 1940,
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and various common law
torts. The fund families are assigned to three separate tracks. The
following chart shows the tracks and judges to whom the mutual
fund families are assigned:
Judge Motz
04-md-15863
AIM*
Alger
Columbia
INVESCO*
Janus
MPS
One Group
PIMCO
Putnam
*These cases (and suits against T. Rowe Price, which were
dismissed) were originally assigned to Judge Stamp who recused
himself for conflict reasons. When reassigned, these cases retained
42
their original designation in Track 4 (04-md-15864).

Judge Blake
04-md-15861
AMCAP
Artisan*
Excelsior
Federated
Scudder
Strong*

Judge Davis
04-md-15862
Alliance
Franklin Templeton
NationsBank
Pilgrim Baxter

Given the number of cases already brought and the amounts
recovered by the SEC and the New York Attorney General, there
appears to be little reason for plan fiduciaries to expend plan
assets to bring additional litigation. However, plan fiduciaries
should monitor the cases and closely examine any settlements to
ensure that the interests of their plans and participants are being
adequately protected. Where settlements have already been
negotiated with government regulators, it is likely that the civil
cases will settle as well.

40. Letter from Judge J. Frederick Motz to Counsel, In re Mutual Funds
Investment Litigation, No. 04-md-15863 (D. Md.) (Feb. 20, 2004), available at

http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/mdl-litigation/mdldocs/initialletter.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Letter from Judge J. Frederick Motz to Counsel, In re Mutual Funds
Investment Litigation, No. 04-md-15864 (D. Md.) (Mar. 23, 2005), available at

http:/ /www.mdd.uscourts.gov/MDL-litigation/MDLDocs /Letterrereassignme
ntofcases.pdf.
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Plan fiduciaries still need to monitor these and other
settlements and take whatever actions are necessary to make sure
that their plan participants receive an appropriate share of the
restitution and penalty payments. Plan fiduciaries should also
keep in mind that the DOL issued Prohibited Transaction
Exemption ("PTE") 2003-39, a class exemption covering litigation
settlements .43
Although compliance with the exemption is only necessary if
the opposing party is a party in interest to the plan, the exemption
provides useful guidance on how to approach settlements. In
particular, fiduciaries of plans that may have ERISA claims in
addition to securities claims should make sure that any releases
granted in a regulatory or securities litigation settlement do not
adversely impact the ERISA claims, or they should obtain
additional compensation for the plan and its participants for
release of those claims." The preamble to PTE 2003-39 indicates
that compliance with class exemption is not necessary when the
settlement is with a service provider, rather than with a fiduciary.
VI. REDEMPTION FEES TO PREVENT MARKET TIMING

In response to the market timing abuses, after originally
proposing mandatory redemption fees, the SEC adopted a rule
permitting plans to impose redemption fees of up to 2% on
investors who traded in or out of a fund within seven days.45 Some
funds had already imposed redemption fees or trading restrictions.
Plan fiduciaries should carefully review their plan documents,
summary plan descriptions and other participant communications
to insure that these redemption fees do not contradict previous
statements made to participants indicating that there are no
redemption fees. In her February 2004 statement, the Assistant
Secretary indicated that the DOL was investigating trading
restrictions and redemption fees in response to the market timing
scandal. The statement indicated that reasonable restrictions and
fees generally would not cause fiduciaries to lose the protections of
section 404(c) of ERISA, which absolves fiduciaries of
responsibility for the investment decisions made by participants.
She emphasized, however, that such fees should be consistent with
the terms of the plan and disclosed to plan participants. Plan

43. 68 Fed. Reg. 75632-01 (Dec. 31, 2003).
44. See generally Machiz, Hennessy & Capuano, UnderstandingDOL's New
Class Exemption for the Release of Claims and Extensions of Credit in
Connection with Litigation, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP., Jan. 13, 2004, at
1-8, available at httpJ/www.fiduciarycounselors.com/press/SettlementPTE
articleBNA.pdf.
45. SEC, supra note 6.
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fiduciaries should quickly communicate any redemption fees to
plan participants and should seek to prevent such fees from being
imposed on plan participants until such communications have
gone out.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent court decisions resulting from Enron and other
corporate scandals have reiterated the well-established principle
that plan fiduciaries have a duty to monitor plan investments and
to take action, if necessary, to protect plan participants. Therefore,
it is critical that plan fiduciaries (e.g., administrative or
investment committees for retirement plans) employ a sound
process to monitor the mutual fund and insurance investigations
and settlements. In particular, plan fiduciaries should:
* Identify who has responsibility for monitoring and, if necessary,
changing the investment funds in their plans;
" Determine whether any of the funds or fund managers are involved
in the scandal;
" Obtain information from all mutual funds, investment managers
and insurance brokers, including those that have not yet been
named in any litigation, about their practices;
*

Obtain information from their investment adviser and other
consultants about any compensation they receive from mutual
funds, insurance companies, their advisers, broker-dealers or other
service providers to the plan;

*

Make a decision as to whether to retain the troubled fund or service
provider;

" Continue to monitor actions by the DOL, SEC and state regulators
that may impact plans; and
*

Be prepared to reconsider decisions as the situation unfolds.

Plan fiduciaries are likely to face increased scrutiny and
administrative complexity as a result of the mutual fund scandals
and the regulatory responses to those scandals. Precipitous action
in the face of these kinds of scandals is almost never the correct
response. Plan fiduciaries should take action, however, to inform
themselves about whether there are any charges involving the
funds in their plans or their affiliates.
Fiduciaries should consult their investment advisers and
attorneys to determine what response, if any, is appropriate.
Above all, fiduciaries should document any actions they have
taken to monitor the situation and any expert advice they have
obtained. Since there is no clear right answer about what
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fiduciaries should do, demonstration that fiduciaries have properly
monitored the situation and considered the available alternatives
should protect fiduciaries if their decisions are subsequently
challenged.

